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Although the CFA monetary union is not an “optimal” currency area as such, it has allowed member countries to benefit from the convertibility guaranteed by the French Treasury and from enhanced policy credibility in achieving low inflation rates. 

Both benefits may be under threat. The convertibility is under threat due to the harder budgetary commitments imposed on France by its membership of the Eurozone and the dwindling political interest in the CFA Franc Zone shown in France. 

The policy credibility is becoming costlier as evidenced by output-inflation trade-offs, which, although still more favourable than in comparable sub-Saharan African countries, have been declining since the 1994 devaluation period.
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The CFA Franc Zone is a monetary union among 15 Sub-Saharan countries. Since the independence of its member countries in the early 1960s, the CFA Franc has been pegged to the currency of France, the former metropolitan country whose Treasury (crucially, not the Bank of France) also provides an unlimited guarantee of the international convertibility of the CFA Franc. When France joined the Euro, the French Franc was replaced by the Euro as the anchor currency, but the French Treasury has retained its role as ultimate guarantor of the CFA Franc. 
The extant literature has already established – theoretically and empirically - that the CFA Franc Zone does not constitute an optimal currency area (OCA) (see for instance  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_7" \o "Cobham, 1994 #51" Cobham and Robson [1994],   and more recently  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_16" \o "Fielding, 2004 #140" Fielding, Lee, and Shields [2004] ,   HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_41" \o "Zhao, 2009 #38"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Zhao</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>38</RecNum><DisplayText>Zhao and Kim (2009)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>38</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1368708769">38</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Zhao, Xiaodan</author><author>Kim, Yoonbai</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Is the CFA Franc zone an optimum currency area?</title><secondary-title>World Development</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>World Development</full-title></periodical><pages>1877-1886</pages><volume>37</volume><number>12</number><dates><year>2009</year></dates><isbn>0305-750X</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Zhao and Kim [2009] ,   HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_6" \o "Carmignani, 2010 #91"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Carmignani</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>91</RecNum><DisplayText>Carmignani (2010)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>91</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1368780994">91</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Carmignani, Fabrizio</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Endogenous optimal currency areas: The case of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community</title><secondary-title>Journal of African Economies</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Journal of African Economies</full-title></periodical><pages>25-51</pages><volume>19</volume><number>1</number><dates><year>2010</year></dates><isbn>0963-8024</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Carmignani [2010] ,  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_20" \o "Loureiro, 2012 #109"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Loureiro</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>109</RecNum><DisplayText>Loureiro, Martins, and Ribeiro (2012)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>109</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1368801468">109</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Loureiro, João</author><author>Martins, Manuel MF</author><author>Ribeiro, Ana Paula</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Anchoring to the Euro (and Grouped Together)? The Case of African Countries</title><secondary-title>Journal of African Economies</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Journal of African Economies</full-title></periodical><pages>28-64</pages><volume>21</volume><number>1</number><dates><year>2012</year></dates><isbn>0963-8024</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Loureiro, Martins, and Ribeiro [2012]  and  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_10" \o "Coulibaly, 2013 #325"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Coulibaly</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>325</RecNum><DisplayText>Coulibaly and Gnimassoun (2013)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>325</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1398678029">325</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Coulibaly, Issiaka</author><author>Gnimassoun, Blaise</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Optimality of a monetary union: New evidence from exchange rate misalignments in West Africa</title><secondary-title>Economic Modelling</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Economic Modelling</full-title></periodical><pages>463-482</pages><volume>32</volume><dates><year>2013</year></dates><isbn>0264-9993</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Coulibaly and Gnimassoun [2013]). Therefore, the very existence of the Zone requires some further assessment of the reasons for its longevity and of its sustainability in the future. As   HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_41" \o "Zhao, 2009 #38"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Zhao</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>38</RecNum><DisplayText>Zhao and Kim (2009)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>38</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1368708769">38</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Zhao, Xiaodan</author><author>Kim, Yoonbai</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Is the CFA Franc zone an optimum currency area?</title><secondary-title>World Development</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>World Development</full-title></periodical><pages>1877-1886</pages><volume>37</volume><number>12</number><dates><year>2009</year></dates><isbn>0305-750X</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Zhao and Kim (2009) state:

[The countries of the CFA Franc Zone] do not appear to form an optimum currency area and the monetary union may have been a costly arrangement for the member countries unless they are compensated with some other benefits. 

This sentiment was echoed by  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_18" \o "Fouda, 2000 #77"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Fouda</Author><Year>2000</Year><RecNum>77</RecNum><DisplayText>Fouda and Stasavage (2000)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>77</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1368711415">77</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Fouda, Seraphin</author><author>Stasavage, David</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>The CFA Franc Zone After EMU: Status Quo, Reform, or Dissolution?</title><secondary-title>The World Economy</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>The World Economy</full-title></periodical><pages>221-233</pages><volume>23</volume><number>2</number><dates><year>2000</year></dates><isbn>1467-9701</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Fouda and Stasavage (2000), who argue that the existence of the CFA Franc Zone cannot be justified on the basis of the OCA, but on the net benefits obtained by increased policy credibility. 
Although both aspects have a clear economic dimension, it was argued in this paper that political considerations (for the existence and survival of the CFA Franc Zone) are equally important, as was also clearly explained by  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_9" \o "Couharde, 2013 #324"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Couharde</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>324</RecNum><DisplayText>Couharde, Coulibaly, Guerreiro, and Mignon (2013)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>324</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1398678001">324</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Couharde, Cécile</author><author>Coulibaly, Issiaka</author><author>Guerreiro, David</author><author>Mignon, Valérie</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Revisiting the theory of optimum currency areas: Is the CFA franc zone sustainable?</title><secondary-title>Journal of Macroeconomics</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Journal of Macroeconomics</full-title></periodical><pages>428-441</pages><volume>38</volume><dates><year>2013</year></dates><isbn>0164-0704</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Couharde, Coulibaly, Guerreiro, and Mignon (2013)  when they conclude on that, “[…] the CFA countries constitute a puzzle from the standpoint of OCA analysis […]. This could be explained […] by its omission of political considerations.”  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_9" \o "Couharde, 2013 #324"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Couharde</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>324</RecNum><DisplayText>Couharde et al. (2013)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>324</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1398678001">324</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Couharde, Cécile</author><author>Coulibaly, Issiaka</author><author>Guerreiro, David</author><author>Mignon, Valérie</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Revisiting the theory of optimum currency areas: Is the CFA franc zone sustainable?</title><secondary-title>Journal of Macroeconomics</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Journal of Macroeconomics</full-title></periodical><pages>428-441</pages><volume>38</volume><dates><year>2013</year></dates><isbn>0164-0704</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Couharde et al. (2013) state that: “Indeed, despite the CFA Zone countries failed to meet several major criteria for being an OCA, the currency union has survived, suggesting that the CFA Zone, while not being optimal, has been at least sustainable...[sic].”
The above comments acquire a particular urgency as  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_27" \o "Nitsch, 2004 #145"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Nitsch</Author><Year>2004</Year><RecNum>145</RecNum><DisplayText>Nitsch (2004)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>145</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1369307221">145</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Nitsch, Volker</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Have a break, have a... national currency: when do monetary unions fall apart?</title><secondary-title>CESIFO Working Paper</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>CESIFO Working Paper</full-title></periodical><volume>113</volume><dates><year>2004</year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Nitsch (2004) and  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_31" \o "Rose, 2007 #75"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Rose</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>75</RecNum><DisplayText>Rose (2007)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>75</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1368711278">75</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Rose, Andrew K</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Checking out: Exits from currency unions</title><secondary-title>CEPR Discussion papers</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>CEPR Discussion papers</full-title></periodical><volume>6254</volume><dates><year>2007</year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Rose (2007), who studied the main drivers behind the break-up of monetary unions, observe that macroeconomic factors have very limited power in predicting currency unions dissolutions, although higher rates of inflation do play a role. One important factor, highlighted by both authors, was the crucial role played by political change. In the case of the CFA Franc Zone, it will be argued that political change may indeed originate from within some, or all, of the member countries of the CFA Franc Zone, but it may be conceivable to assume that a change in the political support to the CFA Franc Zone in France may also, perhaps, play an even more important role.  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_27" \o "Nitsch, 2004 #145"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Nitsch</Author><Year>2004</Year><RecNum>145</RecNum><DisplayText>Nitsch (2004)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>145</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1369307221">145</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Nitsch, Volker</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Have a break, have a... national currency: when do monetary unions fall apart?</title><secondary-title>CESIFO Working Paper</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>CESIFO Working Paper</full-title></periodical><volume>113</volume><dates><year>2004</year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Nitsch (2004) concluded that:

[…] departures from currency unions tend to occur when there is a large inflation differential, between member countries, when the currency union involves a country which is relatively closed to international trade and trade flows fall, and when there is a change in political status of a member. In general, however, macroeconomic factors have only little predictive power for currency union dissolutions.

 HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_31" \o "Rose, 2007 #75"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Rose</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>75</RecNum><DisplayText>Rose (2007)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>75</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1368711278">75</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Rose, Andrew K</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Checking out: Exits from currency unions</title><secondary-title>CEPR Discussion papers</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>CEPR Discussion papers</full-title></periodical><volume>6254</volume><dates><year>2007</year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Rose (2007) notes that:

[...] countries leaving currency unions tend to be larger, richer and more democratic; they also tend to experience somewhat higher inflation. Most strikingly, there is remarkably little macroeconomic volatility around the time of currency unions dissolutions, and only a poor linkage between monetary and political independence. Indeed, aggregate macroeconomic features of the economy do a poor job in predicting currency union exits.

Member countries have benefitted from higher policy credibility (in keeping inflation low), evidenced by a record of consistently low(er) average inflation rates than, for instance, other comparable sub-Saharan African countries, although they also have experienced lower growth rates than comparable countries. The other advantage for member countries comes from the internal and, more importantly, international exchange rate convertibility, which is fully backed by an unlimited financial (and inevitably political) support of the French Treasury, and crucially not the Bank of France. Both these benefits may be under threat if the political support for them weakens. 
Therefore, the main objective and contribution of this paper was to discuss the possible future stability of the CFA Franc Zone. This was carried out, on the one hand, by assessing the political interest shown within France with regard to the CFA Franc Zone. On the other hand, the point of view of the member countries of the CFA Franc Zone was examined by discussing the cost of attaining low inflation, in terms of lower growth, and by providing evidence on the stability of the output inflation trade-offs.
The political support of France for the CFA Franc Zone was measured in two ways. 
The first way was by using the searchable databases of parliamentary questions that were asked in the French Parliament (Assemblée Nationale) over the period 1981-2012. To provide further evidence, the searchable databases of two prestigious French publications with an international outlook,  Le Monde (a daily publication) and its companion publication Le Monde Diplomatique (a monthly publication), were also accessed. The second way was to measure the degree of actual financial support France had given to CFA countries through its Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), and the potential support emanating through the liability of the unlimited guarantee of the international convertibility. It was noted that during the period 1981 - 2015, political (and journalistic) interest had peaked around 1993-1994, the time of the devaluation. However, this interest has faded considerably since then. In terms of actual monetary commitments, the flows of French ODA to the member countries of the CFA Franc Zone have clearly shown a substantial decline after 1994, as also observed by Yehoue (2011), regardless of the way they were measured, whether in nominal or in real terms, in proportion of ODA to other sub-Saharan African countries or to other developing countries, and as a proportion of French GDP, which suggests a dwindling interest by France towards the CFA countries. On the other hand, the potential liability, the “fiscal effort” as mentioned by Veyrune (2007), appears to have been growing quite significantly, putting some pressure on the French Treasury at a time when the membership of the EuroZone is limiting the ability of countries to increase deficits.
To empirically capture the degree of the impact of the enhanced policy credibility, the output inflation trade-off (which links economic growth and inflation together) was estimated for the countries of the CFA Franc Zone and compared to the trade-offs for other sub-Saharan African countries. Moreover, by using recursive regression, evidence was provided on the stability of this trade-off, to allow us to evaluate whether the 1994 devaluation and the initiation of the process leading to independent economic and monetary unions proved to be a breaking point.


The CFA Franc Zone: History And Recent Development

The CFA Franc Zone is a complete monetary union among 15 Sub-Saharan countries, which is divided into three sub-unions issuing their currencies exchanged at par.​[1]​ These are:

i) The Western African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU, in French UEMOA, Union Economique et Monetaire de l’Afrique de l’Ouest) has its own central bank (Central Bank of  Western Africa, in French BCEAO, Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest) situated in Dakar (the capital of Senegal), issuing the CFA Franc (in French Communaute  Financière Africaine, in English African Financial Community). Since 2 May 1997 it includes 8 countries: Benin (formerly Dahomey), Burkina Faso (formerly Haute Volta), Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Togo, Senegal, and the last entrant Guinea Bissau. 
ii) The Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CAEMU, in French CEMAC Communauté économique et monétaire d'Afrique centrale) has its central bank (Central Bank of Central Africa, in French  BEAC, Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale) situated in Yaound (the capital of Cameroon) issuing the CFA Franc (in French Co-operation Financiere Africaine, in English African Financial Co-operation). It includes 6 countries: Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, Equatorial Guinea (joined in 1984), and Gabon.
iii) The 15th country is the Islamic Federal Republic of Comoros that has its own central bank and issues its currency, the Comoroan Franc, at par with the CFA Franc. 

The Franc Zone was officially instituted, on the 26 December 1945, when France ratified the Bretton Woods agreements. Initially it included most of the French colonies.​[2]​ The Central Bank of the West African Monetary Union (BCEAO) started operating in November 1962 and, except for some minor amendments, the BCEAO operated under the statutes signed on 12 May 1962. These were revised under a new treaty signed on 14 November 1973, while an agreement between the Republic of France and the member countries regulating the monetary management was signed on 4 December 1973. The statutes for the precursor of the Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CAEMU) were signed during the period August-November 1960 by the member countries. They were replaced by new monetary conventions on 22-23 of November 1972, and the convention for the Operation Account was signed on 13 March 1973. The Central Banks’ headquarters were in Paris until the 1974 reforms, but they maintained agencies in each country.
The CFA Franc countries have undergone difficult times, particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when events outside their control, like the disinflationary policy by France in 1987 (the so-called Franc-fort policy) and the deterioration of their terms of trade in the late 1980s, compounded by erroneous government and investment policies, led to the 50% devaluation of the CFA Franc with respect to the French Franc that occurred on 2 January 1994. 
Following the devaluation, on 10 January 1994, an additional treaty to establish the Western Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) was signed, followed on 16 March 1994 by an additional treaty aimed at establishing the Central Africa Economic and Monetary Union (CAEMU). 
The four principles of the CFA Franc Zone are (see  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_4" \o "Banque de France, 2010 #97"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Banque de France</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>97</RecNum><DisplayText>Banque de France (2010)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>97</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1368782065">97</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Banque de France,</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>The Franc Zone</title><secondary-title>Fact sheet</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Fact sheet</full-title></periodical><volume>N. 127</volume><number>July</number><dates><year>2010</year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Banque de France [2010]):

1.	Unlimited convertibility guarantee from the French Treasury.​[3]​
2.	Fixed parity with the anchor currency (initially the French Franc, now the Euro).​[4]​
3.	In principle monetary transfers are free within the area, although the two different CFA Francs are not convertible directly to each other, and a tax is actually levied for this transaction. 
4.	Pooling of foreign exchange reserves.

The states pool their reserves into each of the two central banks. In return for the unlimited convertibility guaranteed by France, the two central banks are obliged to deposit a proportion (currently 50%) of their foreign exchange reserves with the French Treasury, on the Operation Accounts held for each bank. 
The Central Banks issue a common currency, hold external reserves on behalf of the entire area (kept in the Operations Account in Paris equivalent to sight accounts, but interest bearing with unlimited overdraft facilities) and provide credit facilities to banks, other financial institutions and the governments of its member countries. A further important characteristic of the CFA Franc Zone is its international convertibility, guaranteed by the French Treasury.​[5]​   
Finally, according to the most recent annual report of the CFA Franc Zone  (), of the four criteria for multilateral financial surveillance (positive primary budget, inflation rate of 3% or below, a public sector debt of no more than 70% of GDP, and no increase in government arrears) only Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger satisfied all of them in the WAEMU, while the situation in the other countries was, if anything, worsening. In the CAEMU, only one country, Cameroon, satisfied the four criteria. These criteria should have initially been satisfied by January 2003. This deadline has been postponed several times, the first being until 31 December 2005, and then again until 2008, and then again until 2013 in the WAEMU. There is now no deadline as such in the CAEMU, where the compliance with the criteria situation is being monitored on an annual basis. 

Empirical Evaluation of The CFA Franc Zone: Dynamics of the Output-Inflation Trade-offs and the Degree of Political Support in France

In this section the two main benefits arising from participation in the CFA Franc Zone will be empirically assessed. First of all, attention will be paid to the benefit of increased policy credibility to achieve lower inflation rates. In the second part of this section, the political commitment of France will be assessed in order to provide some evidence of the potential sustainability of the unlimited guarantee of the convertibility.
Monetary stability has become the objective to be achieved by joining a monetary union. In the literature on OCA, similarity of inflation rates among member states has evolved from being a necessary pre-requisite for setting up a monetary union ( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_17" \o "Fleming, 1971 #101"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Fleming</Author><Year>1971</Year><RecNum>101</RecNum><DisplayText>Fleming (1971)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>101</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1368784153">101</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Fleming, J Marcus</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>On exchange rate unification</title><secondary-title>The Economic Journal</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>The Economic Journal</full-title></periodical><pages>467-488</pages><volume>81</volume><number>323</number><dates><year>1971</year></dates><isbn>0013-0133</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Fleming [1971] ,  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_8" \o "Corden, 1972 #62"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Corden</Author><Year>1972</Year><RecNum>62</RecNum><DisplayText>Corden (1972)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>62</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1368710696">62</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Corden, Warner Max</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Monetary integration</title></titles><number>93</number><dates><year>1972</year></dates><publisher>International Finance Section, Princeton University</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Corden [1972]) to becoming a possible (desirable) outcome (target) of it (see  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_11" \o "De Grauwe, 1975 #102"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>De Grauwe</Author><Year>1975</Year><RecNum>102</RecNum><DisplayText>De Grauwe (1975)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>102</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1368784236">102</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>De Grauwe, Paul</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Conditions for monetary integration—A geometric interpretation</title><secondary-title>Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv</full-title></periodical><pages>634-646</pages><volume>111</volume><number>4</number><dates><year>1975</year></dates><isbn>0043-2636</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>De Grauwe [1975] and  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_35" \o "Tavlas, 1993 #90"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Tavlas</Author><Year>1993</Year><RecNum>90</RecNum><DisplayText>Tavlas (1993)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>90</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1368780977">90</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Tavlas, George S</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>The ‘new’theory of optimum currency areas</title><secondary-title>The World Economy</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>The World Economy</full-title></periodical><pages>663-685</pages><volume>16</volume><number>6</number><dates><year>1993</year></dates><isbn>1467-9701</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Tavlas 1993]), because joining a monetary union with a stronger partner would enhance the credibility of the commitment to low inflation.
Moreover, the so-called "new optimal currency areas theory" (see  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_35" \o "Tavlas, 1993 #90"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Tavlas</Author><Year>1993</Year><RecNum>90</RecNum><DisplayText>Tavlas (1993)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>90</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1368780977">90</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Tavlas, George S</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>The ‘new’theory of optimum currency areas</title><secondary-title>The World Economy</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>The World Economy</full-title></periodical><pages>663-685</pages><volume>16</volume><number>6</number><dates><year>1993</year></dates><isbn>1467-9701</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Tavlas (1993),  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_14" \o "Dellas, 2009 #55"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Dellas</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>55</RecNum><DisplayText>Dellas and Tavlas (2009)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>55</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1368710310">55</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Dellas, Harris</author><author>Tavlas, George S</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>An optimum-currency-area odyssey</title><secondary-title>Journal of International Money and Finance</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Journal of International Money and Finance</full-title></periodical><pages>1117-1137</pages><volume>28</volume><number>7</number><dates><year>2009</year></dates><isbn>0261-5606</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Dellas and Tavlas (2009),  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Mongelli</Author><Year>2005</Year><RecNum>120</RecNum><DisplayText>(De Grauwe, 1975); Mongelli (2005)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>120</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1369062456">120</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Mongelli, Francesco Paolo</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>What is European Economic and Monetary Union Telling us About the Properties of Optimum Currency Areas?*</title><secondary-title>JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies</full-title></periodical><pages>607-635</pages><volume>43</volume><number>3</number><dates><year>2005</year></dates><isbn>1468-5965</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>De Grauwe</Author><Year>1975</Year><RecNum>102</RecNum><record><rec-number>102</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1368784236">102</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>De Grauwe, Paul</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Conditions for monetary integration—A geometric interpretation</title><secondary-title>Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv</full-title></periodical><pages>634-646</pages><volume>111</volume><number>4</number><dates><year>1975</year></dates><isbn>0043-2636</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote> HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_11" \o "De Grauwe, 1975 #102" De Grauwe (1975);  [see also a later version in  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>De Grauwe</Author><Year>1996</Year><RecNum>66</RecNum><DisplayText>De Grauwe (1996); (De Grauwe, 2012)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>66</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1368710866">66</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>De Grauwe, Paul</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>The economics of convergence: Towards monetary union in Europe</title><secondary-title>Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv</full-title></periodical><pages>1-27</pages><volume>132</volume><number>1</number><dates><year>1996</year></dates><isbn>0043-2636</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>De Grauwe</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>65</RecNum><record><rec-number>65</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1368710820">65</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>De Grauwe, Paul</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Economics of monetary union</title></titles><dates><year>2012</year></dates><publisher>OUP Oxford</publisher><isbn>0199605572</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote> HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_12" \o "De Grauwe, 1996 #66" De Grauwe (1996)]; )) objects to the fact that joining a monetary union would mean sacrificing monetary independence. In fact, in a world where the Phillips curve is believed to be vertical in the long run, the costs from sacrificing a monetary policy are negligible, because the only freedom forfeited would be the freedom of choosing a national inflation rate, not a different level of employment.
To sum up, from the above, admittedly cursory, analysis two conclusions can be drawn: first, a credible commitment to peg the currency will enable the weakest countries to reap the benefits of low inflation and, second, in the long run the costs of forfeiting monetary independence are negligible, although the costs may not be negligible in the short term. 
The above analysis gathers even more significance for a country with a short-run vertical Phillips curve. In such a country considerable reductions of inflation can happen without costs in terms of lost output. However, the newly gained credibility (in achieving a lower inflation rate) might lead economic agents to adjust their preferences and expectations and possibly make the Phillips curve flatter, which, in the due course, may cause any further reduction in inflation to be costlier. 
This is the proposition of the new Keynesians such as  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_3" \o "Ball, 1988 #36"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Ball</Author><Year>1988</Year><RecNum>36</RecNum><DisplayText>Ball et al. (1988)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>36</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1368708657">36</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Ball, Laurence</author><author>Mankiw, N Gregory</author><author>Romer, David</author><author>Akerlof, George A</author><author>Rose, Andrew</author><author>Yellen, Janet</author><author>Sims, Christopher A</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>The new Keynesian economics and the output-inflation trade-off</title><secondary-title>Brookings papers on economic activity</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Brookings papers on economic activity</full-title></periodical><pages>1-82</pages><volume>1988</volume><number>1</number><dates><year>1988</year></dates><isbn>0007-2303</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Ball et al. (1988), who argue that the output-inflation trade-off is inversely related to the mean of inflation, thereby implying that disinflation costs are higher the lower the initial rate of inflation.
One consequence of this is that the output-inflation trade-offs (and subsequently the costs of following a deflationary policy) are higher, the lower the average rate of inflation.
As shown in Table 1, the member countries of the CFA Franc Zone have experienced lower rates of inflation, typically accompanied by lower rates of growth in GDP than other comparable sub-Saharan African countries. 

< TABLE 1 HERE >

Table 2 re-organises the information provided in Table 1, by dividing the table into four quadrants: high/low inflation rates (higher/lower than the median inflation rate of sub-Saharan African [developing only] countries at 9.2%) and high/low rates of real GDP growth (higher/lower than the median rate of real GDP growth of sub-Saharan African [developing only] countries at 3.5%).​[6]​

< TABLE 2 HERE >

In general it was pretty clear that most member countries of the CFA Franc Zone are located in the low inflation/low real GDP growth rate quadrant (south-west). However, there are a few notable exceptions, such as Chad and Burkina Faso, that have experienced high inflation but higher than average rate of growth, while the oil producing countries of CAEMU (Cameroon, Gabon and the Republic of Congo) alongside Benin and Mali have experienced inflation lower than the median and higher growth, and are located in the south-east quadrant (low inflation/high growth). All comparator sub-Saharan African countries are in the north-east quadrant (high inflation/high growth).
The achievement of lower rates of inflation had already been emphasised in the literature, for instance by  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_15" \o "Devarajan, 1991 #135"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Devarajan</Author><Year>1991</Year><RecNum>135</RecNum><DisplayText>Devarajan and Rodrik (1991)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>135</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1369229575">135</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Report">27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Devarajan, Shantayanan</author><author>Rodrik, Dani</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Do the benefits of fixed exchange rates outweigh their costs? The Franc zone in Africa</title></titles><dates><year>1991</year></dates><publisher>National Bureau of Economic Research</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Devarajan and Rodrik (1991), who, however, argued that the revealed preferences of the CFA governments were too biased towards low inflation at the expenses of real growth, concluding on the whole that the fixed parity arrangement had been a “bad bargain”. According to their own highly stylised calculations the revealed inflation-output trade-offs or "…the maximum increase in inflation that a government is revealed to be willing to trade off against a single percentage point increase in growth, given that it has chosen to join the CFA Zone" (1991) amounted to a ratio of an increase by 1.51% in inflation, in exchange for a further 1% rate of GDP growth. Although the results were quite sensitive to some important assumptions in terms of inflation target, the paper was important in highlighting the importance of the short-term output-inflation trade-off. 
To provide some empirical evidence on the dynamics of the output-inflation trade-off for the CFA countries and other sub-Saharan African countries, the model developed by  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_1" \o "Abbott, 2008 #23"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Abbott</Author><Year>2008</Year><RecNum>23</RecNum><DisplayText>Abbott and Martínez (2008)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>23</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1368708118">23</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Abbott, Brant</author><author>Martínez, Cristina</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>An updated assessment of the Lucas supply curve and the inflation–output trade-off</title><secondary-title>Economics Letters</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Economics Letters</full-title></periodical><pages>199-201</pages><volume>101</volume><number>3</number><dates><year>2008</year></dates><isbn>0165-1765</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Abbott and Martínez (2008) based on the seminal paper by  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_21" \o "Lucas, 1973 #134"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Lucas</Author><Year>1973</Year><RecNum>134</RecNum><DisplayText>Lucas (1973)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>134</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1369229360">134</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Lucas, Robert E</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Some international evidence on output-inflation tradeoffs</title><secondary-title>The American Economic Review</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>The American Economic Review</full-title></periodical><pages>326-334</pages><volume>63</volume><number>3</number><dates><year>1973</year></dates><isbn>0002-8282</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Lucas (1973) will be estimated by Ordinary Least Squares with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance.
The model used for estimating the output-inflation trade-off for each of the CFA countries also includes a dummy variable (D) that takes the value of zero before 1994 and one after 1994 to capture the effect of the devaluation.

      (1)

Where yt is real GDP, is the shift variable (nominal GDP),  is the first difference symbol and D is a dummy variable taking the value of zero before 1994 and one after 1994.

The model used for estimating the output-inflation trade-off for each of the other sub-Saharan countries is the model developed by  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_1" \o "Abbott, 2008 #23"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Abbott</Author><Year>2008</Year><RecNum>23</RecNum><DisplayText>Abbott and Martínez (2008)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>23</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1368708118">23</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Abbott, Brant</author><author>Martínez, Cristina</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>An updated assessment of the Lucas supply curve and the inflation–output trade-off</title><secondary-title>Economics Letters</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Economics Letters</full-title></periodical><pages>199-201</pages><volume>101</volume><number>3</number><dates><year>2008</year></dates><isbn>0165-1765</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Abbott and Martínez (2008) without the dummy variable​[7]​:

    (2)

Where yt is real GDP,  is the shift variable (nominal GDP),  is the first difference symbol.
The output-inflation trade-off captured by the parameter  in equation (1) and equation (2) is the response in terms of supply of goods and services of economic agents to movements in prices. 
Therefore a higher  will be a feature of countries with a strong(er) credibility and reputation for achieving lower inflation rates. 
The advantage of using this model is the fact that it is quite simple and requires data (nominal and real GDP) easily available for both developed and developing countries, unlike unemployment rates and price expectations, which are very difficult to measure, particularly for developing countries.  
In the original paper by  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_21" \o "Lucas, 1973 #134"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Lucas</Author><Year>1973</Year><RecNum>134</RecNum><DisplayText>Lucas (1973)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>134</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1369229360">134</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Lucas, Robert E</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Some international evidence on output-inflation tradeoffs</title><secondary-title>The American Economic Review</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>The American Economic Review</full-title></periodical><pages>326-334</pages><volume>63</volume><number>3</number><dates><year>1973</year></dates><isbn>0002-8282</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Lucas (1973) the problem for the economic agents was to disentangle the movement in relative prices (the price of their own sector) from the general movement of prices. The slope of the output-inflation curve would capture the degree of responsiveness - very flat if movements in prices were perceived as being movements in relative prices, or very steep if general inflation was the cause of the movement of prices. The short-term Phillips curve captures the ability of an economy to lower the unemployment rate below its natural rate by manipulating nominal variables. The effect is short-lived, until the new expectations of prices are incorporated into the Phillips curve, while structural features of the labour market influence the slope. Another interpretation is that, if  is close to 1, a change in prices will be reflected in changes in output, whereas if  is close to 0, to have an impact upon output, the change in prices must be considerable. Therefore a higher  will be a feature of countries with a strong(er) credibility and reputation for achieving lower inflation rates. 
 HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_21" \o "Lucas, 1973 #134"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Lucas</Author><Year>1973</Year><RecNum>134</RecNum><DisplayText>Lucas (1973)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>134</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1369229360">134</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Lucas, Robert E</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Some international evidence on output-inflation tradeoffs</title><secondary-title>The American Economic Review</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>The American Economic Review</full-title></periodical><pages>326-334</pages><volume>63</volume><number>3</number><dates><year>1973</year></dates><isbn>0002-8282</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Lucas (1973) has very clearly explained this by stating that:

In a stable country like the United States (or Germany or Switzerland), then, policies which increase nominal income tend to have a large initial effect on real output, together with a small, positive initial effect on the rate of inflation. Thus the apparent short-term trade-off is favourable, so long as it remains unused. In contrast, in a volatile price country like Argentina, nominal income changes are associated with equal, contemporaneous price movements with no discernible effect on real output. These results are, of course, inconsistent with the existence of even moderately stable Phillips curves. 

All the results obtained by estimating equation (1) for the CFA Franc Zone countries and equation (2) for other sub-Saharan countries are summarised in Table 3.   
The issue of potential heteroskedasticty was dealt with by using White heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors, while the addition of the lagged dependent variable can help address concerns around auto-correlation (auto-correlation happened to be a problem only for Benin, where two lags were added).   
As reported in the papers by  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_2" \o "Achen, 2000 #618"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Achen</Author><Year>2000</Year><RecNum>618</RecNum><DisplayText>Achen (2000)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>618</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1450176644">618</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Achen, Christopher H</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Why lagged dependent variables can suppress the explanatory power of other independent variables</title><secondary-title>Ann Arbor</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Ann Arbor</full-title></periodical><pages>48106-1248</pages><volume>1001</volume><number>2000</number><dates><year>2000</year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Achen (2000) and  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_19" \o "Keele, 2006 #617"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Keele</Author><Year>2006</Year><RecNum>617</RecNum><DisplayText>Keele and Kelly (2006)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>617</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1450176491">617</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Keele, Luke</author><author>Kelly, Nathan J</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Dynamic models for dynamic theories: The ins and outs of lagged dependent variables</title><secondary-title>Political analysis</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Political analysis</full-title></periodical><pages>186-205</pages><volume>14</volume><number>2</number><dates><year>2006</year></dates><isbn>1047-1987</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Keele and Kelly (2006) the addition of the lagged dependent variable  may create an issue with endogeneity. In these papers the authors reach a number of conclusions through Montecarlo simulations:

a) If a lagged dependent variable is added to a static model, the estimates of the coefficients are biased downwards. Keele and Kelly (2006) estimate the bias as -60% according to the RMSE, regardless of auto-correlation, whereas a static model estimated by OLS would produce biased estimates of the coefficient(s) increasing with the degree of auto-correlation.
b) However, if the lagged dependent variable is correctly added to a dynamic model, the negative bias increases in line with auto-correlation (-5% for a 0.20 autocorrelation). However, the bias for an incorrectly specified model (i.e. a dynamic model without lagged dependent variable) the bias is substantially higher, regardless of auto-correlation (bias estimated at 230%). 

Therefore, the conclusion is that if the original model explicitly required a lagged dependent variable (i.e. it was a dynamic model), the lagged dependent variable should be kept. The Lucas model does include the lagged dependent variable (Lucas 1973) and the issue of endogeneity has never been raised by previous authors. Moreover, finding appropriate instrumental variables was difficult.  
The results show that in the post-devaluation period, the trade-off changed, implying that a reduction (an increase) in inflation in the CFA would lead to a smaller reduction (smaller increase) in their GDP growth. The change was particularly pronounced in the CAEMU, but also significant in the WAEMU. Nonetheless, the trade-offs are still more favourable than in most other sub-Saharan African countries, suggesting that the credibility conferred by the membership of the CFA Franc Zone was still higher than in those countries, although it has been dented by the devaluation. 

< TABLE 3 HERE >

To reinforce and complement the above conclusion that 1994 may have been a watershed and the trade-offs have deteriorated after the devaluation, an event which may have dented the credibility of the CFA Franc Zone, the output-inflation trade-off for the member countries of the CFA Franc Zone was also estimated by means of recursive least squares (RLS), which is widely used to test for the stability of parameters. In practical terms, Equation (1), without the dummy variable, was estimated for an initial sample period, and then one observation was added to the sample and the model was estimated again. Each iteration would generate a new estimate of the parameter . If these new estimates were plotted on a graph against time, the main reason for using RLS, it would be possible to see how the parameter  had changed, and whether there had been a structural break. It is important to argue that the devaluation has also been accompanied by a reduced support by the French political establishment, and that the partially successful attempts at gaining credibility by enforcing stricter criteria in terms of inflation, government deficits and government arrears may not have helped in fully restoring confidence in the CFA Franc.
Figure 1 shows the estimates obtained by using recursive least square regressions. It is noteworthy that 1994 represented a structural break and that, with a few exceptions, the trade-off did not go back to the pre-1994 values, suggesting that the credibility arising from the monetary arrangements may have somehow been reduced. 

< FIGURE 1 HERE >

The second part of the empirical analysis completely eschews econometric analysis and focuses on the political side of the agreement between France and the CFA Franc Zone. 
As  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_36" \o "Van de Walle, 1991 #98"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Van de Walle</Author><Year>1991</Year><RecNum>98</RecNum><DisplayText>Van de Walle (1991)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>98</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1368782578">98</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Van de Walle, Nicolas</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>The decline of the Franc zone: monetary politics in Francophone Africa</title><secondary-title>African Affairs</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>African Affairs</full-title></periodical><pages>383-405</pages><volume>90</volume><number>360</number><dates><year>1991</year></dates><isbn>0001-9909</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Van de Walle (1991),  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_39" \o "Wauthier, 1995 #150"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Wauthier</Author><Year>1995</Year><RecNum>150</RecNum><DisplayText>Wauthier (1995)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>150</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1369396051">150</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Wauthier, Claude</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Quatre Presidents et l&apos;Afrique: De Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard d&apos;Estaing, Mitterrand</title></titles><dates><year>1995</year></dates><publisher>Seuil</publisher><isbn>2020183560</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Wauthier (1995),   HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_34" \o "Stasavage, 1997 #124"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Stasavage</Author><Year>1997</Year><RecNum>124</RecNum><DisplayText>Stasavage (1997)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>124</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1369147917">124</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Stasavage, David</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>The CFA franc zone and fiscal discipline</title><secondary-title>Journal of African Economies</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Journal of African Economies</full-title></periodical><pages>132-167</pages><volume>6</volume><number>1</number><dates><year>1997</year></dates><isbn>0963-8024</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Stasavage (1997) have extensively explained, the French political establishment has had very tight links with the countries involved in the CFA Franc Zone. As long as France supports it politically, the CFA Franc Zone should survive. However, there is a clear trend, starting in 1993, which shows both less interest and less support for the CFA Franc Zone on the part of France.  There are various reasons for this, but a political generational change is most definitely one of them (see for instance  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_25" \o "Moncrieff, 2012 #158"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Moncrieff</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>158</RecNum><DisplayText>Moncrieff (2012)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>158</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1371032220">158</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Moncrieff, Richard</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>French Africa policy: Sarkozy&apos;s legacy, and prospects for a Hollande Presidency</title><secondary-title>South African Journal of International Affairs</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>South African Journal of International Affairs</full-title></periodical><pages>359-380</pages><volume>19</volume><number>3</number><dates><year>2012</year></dates><isbn>1022-0461</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Moncrieff [2012] on the relationship between president Sarkozy and sub-Saharan Africa). As pointed out by  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_37" \o "Veyrune, 2007 #151"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Veyrune</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>151</RecNum><DisplayText>Veyrune (2007)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>151</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1369400481">151</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Veyrune, Romain</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Fixed Exchange Rates and the Autonomy of Monetary Policy: The Franc Zone Case</title></titles><dates><year>2007</year></dates><publisher>International Monetary Fund</publisher><isbn>1282447866</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Veyrune (2007), the costs for the French taxpayer are not negligible and could increase in line with the financial development of the member countries. Moreover, the current financial and budget crisis could make the cost of the unlimited guarantee quite high, with very little political justification for support to middle income countries such as some of the oil-exporting CAEMU countries. 
The way the issue was analysed here was by searching the database of questions (oral and written) asked in the French Parliament.​[8]​  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_23" \o "Martin, 2011 #624"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Martin</Author><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>624</RecNum><DisplayText>Martin (2011)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>624</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1453114345">624</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Martin, Shane</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Using parliamentary questions to measure constituency focus: an application to the Irish case</title><secondary-title>Political Studies</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Political Studies</full-title></periodical><pages>472-488</pages><volume>59</volume><number>2</number><dates><year>2011</year></dates><isbn>1467-9248</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Martin (2011),  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_32" \o "Rozenberg, 2011 #626"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Rozenberg</Author><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>626</RecNum><DisplayText>Rozenberg and Martin (2011)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>626</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1453114592">626</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Rozenberg, Olivier</author><author>Martin, Shane</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Questioning parliamentary questions</title><secondary-title>The Journal of Legislative Studies</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>The Journal of Legislative Studies</full-title></periodical><pages>394-404</pages><volume>17</volume><number>3</number><dates><year>2011</year></dates><isbn>1357-2334</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Rozenberg and Martin (2011) and  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_33" \o "Saalfeld, 2011 #620"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Saalfeld</Author><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>620</RecNum><DisplayText>Saalfeld (2011)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>620</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1450353985">620</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Saalfeld, Thomas</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Parliamentary questions as instruments of substantive representation: Visible minorities in the UK House of Commons, 2005–10</title><secondary-title>The Journal of Legislative Studies</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>The Journal of Legislative Studies</full-title></periodical><pages>271-289</pages><volume>17</volume><number>3</number><dates><year>2011</year></dates><isbn>1357-2334</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Saalfeld (2011) have used this method with interesting results in other areas of research. To provide further support to this finding, the database of articles published in Le Monde and its companion publication Le Monde Diplomatique were also searched.  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_29" \o "Ramirez, 2014 #352"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Ramirez</Author><Year>2014</Year><RecNum>352</RecNum><DisplayText>Ramirez (2014)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>352</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1400065803">352</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Ramirez, Carlos D.</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Is corruption in China “out of control”? A comparison with the US in historical perspective</title><secondary-title>Journal of Comparative Economics</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Journal of Comparative Economics</full-title></periodical><pages>76-91</pages><volume>42</volume><number>1</number><keywords><keyword>Corruption</keyword><keyword>Newspapers</keyword><keyword>China</keyword><keyword>US history</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2014</year></dates><isbn>0147-5967</isbn><urls><related-urls><url>http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596713001054</url></related-urls></urls><electronic-resource-num>http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2013.07.003</electronic-resource-num></record></Cite></EndNote>Ramirez (2014) has also used a similar approach in another area of research not related to the CFA Franc. This should be seen almost as a natural experiment, where both the political establishment and the wider public reveal their true interest in a particular subject. 
It is admittedly entirely reasonable to argue that ‘absence of evidence [of interest] should not  necessarily be construed as evidence of absence [of interest]’. Therefore the analysis should provide some, albeit perhaps anecdotal, evidence of the ebbs and flows of the concern for the CFA Franc Zone shown by the political establishment and the general public. It is important to stress that the search was sharply focused on the CFA Franc Zone as a monetary entity. Interest on current, political and perhaps even mundane events taking place in individual countries were not taken into consideration, because they were not related specifically to the workings of the CFA Franc Zone. 
It is clearly undeniable that events such as the recent military intervention in Cote d’Ivoire and Mali clearly show that France still has a considerable interest in the countries belonging to the CFA Franc Zone. However, as was also pointed out by  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_25" \o "Moncrieff, 2012 #158"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Moncrieff</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>158</RecNum><DisplayText>Moncrieff (2012)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>158</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1371032220">158</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Moncrieff, Richard</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>French Africa policy: Sarkozy&apos;s legacy, and prospects for a Hollande Presidency</title><secondary-title>South African Journal of International Affairs</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>South African Journal of International Affairs</full-title></periodical><pages>359-380</pages><volume>19</volume><number>3</number><dates><year>2012</year></dates><isbn>1022-0461</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Moncrieff (2012) and  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_24" \o "Melly, 2013 #159"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Melly</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>159</RecNum><DisplayText>Melly and Darracq (2013)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>159</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1371035571">159</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Melly, Paul </author><author>Darracq, Vincent </author></authors></contributors><titles><title>A New Way to Engage? French Policy in Africa from Sarkozy to Hollande</title><secondary-title>Chatham House</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Chatham House</full-title></periodical><number>01</number><dates><year>2013</year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Melly and Darracq (2013),  France also has military bases in sub-Saharan Africa in countries outside the CFA Franc Zone (Djibouti), and is now undertaking various military operations under the aegis of NATO. 
Table 4 reports the number of legislatures, their duration and the total number of questions as recorded in the database. 
 
< TABLE 4 HERE >

A search for the key words “CFA Franc Zone” gave the results that are summarised in Table 5. The results are organised in a chronological order, following the parliamentary legislatures.​[9]​ 

< TABLE 5 HERE >

To put things in the right context, a similar database of the European parliament produced only two questions, showing that the European Union was not quite ready to replace France in supporting the CFA Franc Zone.​[10]​ 
The findings from the three databases appear to be highly correlated and appear to follow very similar paths as shown in Figure 2, where the proportion of questions asked peak in the period around 1993-1994, when 80% of all questions about the “CFA Franc Zone” where asked during the legislature 1993-1997. Before this period, the CFA Franc Zone had attracted very limited interest, both in the Parliament and the media, while the attention of both the Parliament and the media has quickly faded in recent times. 

< FIGURE 2 HERE >

To provide further evidence of the actual commitment of France to the countries of the CFA Franc Zone, an assessment of the Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) flows from France to the member countries of the CFA Franc Zone will be carried out. This analysis should only be seen as providing a backdrop for the evaluation of the potential financial commitment envisaged by the unlimited guarantee of the convertibility, which will be carried out later in the section.  
Figure 3 reports the five-year averages (to smooth the inevitable changes from year to year) of the proportion of the Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) flows from France to the member countries of the CFA Franc Zone, over the total going to sub-Sahara Africa and over the total going to developing countries. It was apparent that the proportion of ODA flows from France to the member countries of the CFA Franc Zone followed exactly the same pattern in both cases: it increased up to the early 1980s, followed a plateau between 1978 and 1996, but then fell considerably up until 2008, before increasing slightly in more recent years. 

< FIGURE 3 HERE >

To reinforce the conclusion, Figure 4 reports the nominal and real flows of ODA to the countries of the CFA Franc Zone, while Figure 5 shows ODA to the CFA Franc Zone as a proportion of French GDP. Every measure used shows a clear decline, after a peak was reached around the mid-1990s. The decline in flows of ODA was also mirrored in the restructuring of the Ministère du Development, which has very recently been downgraded to a simple delegation for the Francophonie. 

< FIGURE 4 HERE >

< FIGURE 5 HERE >

Figure 6 shows the evolution, over the period 1991-2011, of the potential cost (total effort) of the unlimited guarantee of the CFA Franc based on the M2 of the CFA Franc Zone as a percentage of French GDP.​[11]​  Figure 6 also includes French ODA towards the countries of the CFA Franc Zone, as well as French ODA towards the countries of the CFA Franc Zone combined with any debt relief the countries of the CFA Franc Zone have received.​[12]​ Since it was not possible to allocate debt relief by donor country, it was simply assumed that 100% of the debt relief enjoyed by the CFA Franc Zone countries originated from France, possibly artificially boosting the ODA commitment by France. Figure 6 shows that, with the exception of 2006 when there was a spike in the time series due to debt relief for Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali and Senegal, the combined data rarely exceeded 0.2% of French GDP and, although a trend was not discernible, it was clearly not on an upward trajectory. However, Figure 6 shows that the potential cost of the unlimited guarantee was clearly on an upward trajectory. If the reserves of the CFA countries are taken into account, the ratio falls, although it would still be on an upward trend in more recent years. However, there was some evidence that reserves are highly vulnerable to movements in oil prices, and appear to be highly concentrated in a few countries, in particular among some oil-exporting countries of the CAEMU.
To provide further perspective,  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_24" \o "Melly, 2013 #159"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Vincent</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>159</RecNum><DisplayText>Melly and Darracq (2013)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>159</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1371035571">159</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Melly, Paul </author><author>Darracq, Vincent </author></authors></contributors><titles><title>A New Way to Engage? French Policy in Africa from Sarkozy to Hollande</title><secondary-title>Chatham House</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Chatham House</full-title></periodical><number>01</number><dates><year>2013</year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Melly and Darracq (2013) stated that the normal French military presence in military bases in sub-Saharan Africa (predominantly in countries belonging to the CFA Franc Zone, apart from Djibouti) cost France  €400–450 million a year (approximately US$ 600 million, or 0.022% of French GDP).​[13]​

< FIGURE 6 HERE >

The future direction of this total effort is conditional upon two developments: one (the denominator) is explained by French GDP, the other (the numerator of the ratio) is linked to developments in the banking system of the CFA Franc countries, in particular the M2 monetary aggregate and their sub-categories notes and coins in circulation, deposits with banks and quasi-money on the one hand, and net foreign reserves on the other hand. 
Table 6 compares the evolution of M2 (as a percentage of GDP) of the CFA Franc countries to other sub-Saharan countries and a few developed economies for comparison over the period 1960 to 2010. 
It is clear that in 1960, in terms of monetary development, the CFA countries were lagging behind other countries. Although they have considerably reduced the gap, particularly with other sub-Saharan countries, they are still behind countries like Kenya, India, and South Africa, not to mention developed economies. It must also be noted that there is a wide disparity of development even within the CFA Franc Zone. 
This seems to indicate that, as already noted by  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_37" \o "Veyrune, 2007 #151"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Veyrune</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>151</RecNum><DisplayText>Veyrune (2007)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>151</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1369400481">151</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Veyrune, Romain</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Fixed Exchange Rates and the Autonomy of Monetary Policy: The Franc Zone Case</title></titles><dates><year>2007</year></dates><publisher>International Monetary Fund</publisher><isbn>1282447866</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Veyrune (2007), the implied liability is bound to grow in line with the monetary development of the CFA Franc Zone countries. 

< TABLE 6 HERE >

Moreover, as reported in Table 7 there is not only a wide dispersion of M2/GDP ratios, but some member countries, in particular in the CAEMU,   also have significantly different proportions of notes and coins in circulation (monnaie fiduciare), sight deposits (monnaie fiduciare) and quasi-money (quasi-monnaie i.e. other assets). In particular, the higher prevalence of cash and notes in countries such as Central African Republic and Chad in the CAEMU, and Niger in the WAEMU, suggest that M2 could grow in line with developments in the banking sector in those countries. 

< TABLE 7 HERE >

Finally, two further indicators were computed. One, shown in the first two columns of Table 8 and called “Reserves” (%), measures the relative contribution of each country to the overall net foreign reserves held by CAEMU and WAEMU respectively. It must be noted that in both unions, some reserves were not allocated to any country (“non-repartis” in French). The amount not allocated to any country was particularly significant in the past, but it has been reduced in more recent years. It was noticeable that in the CAEMU, which incidentally holds more than 50% of the net foreign reserves of the entire CFA Franc Zone, a few oil-exporting countries contribute the most: Congo 37.5%, Equatorial Guinea 19.5% and Gabon 12.8%. Poorer countries, such as Chad and Central African Republic, contribute significantly less. 

< TABLE 8 HERE >

In the WAEMU the distribution is slightly more balanced, although Cote d’Ivoire contributes the most (31%), and Togo significantly less (5%). 
A second indicator, shown in the third and fourth column of Table 8 and called “reserves cover” (%), measures the extent to which net foreign assets covered monetary liabilities by country. In this case, in the WAEMU, but not in the CAEMU, some monetary liabilities are issued by a body called “services centraux” (central services), and are not allocated to any specific country. 
Again the disparity between the two unions is quite clear, with countries such as Congo and Equatorial Guinea more than able to cover their own monetary liabilities, and other oil-exporting countries such as Cameroon and Gabon able to cover more than half of their monetary liabilities. Surprisingly, perhaps, Chad also appears to have a high cover rate, but this could be due to the low development of its monetary system. The situation in the WAEMU is more homogenous, with a narrower range of 31% to 68%. 
However, the extent of the reserves cover can be attributed, as in the case of Chad, to the (lower) development of the monetary system. Indeed, the correlation between reserve cover and M2/GDP ratio, with the exclusion of the Central African Republic (which appears to be an outlier), is -0.43 (with the inclusion of CAR the value is -0.25). This provides some evidence that the reserve cover might be achieved because of the low level of monetary development.
The above results indicate that net foreign reserves are quite concentrated in relatively few countries, predominantly oil-exporting ones, introducing an element of volatility and vulnerability of the reserves to changes in both the demand for, and the price of, oil. Moreover, there is some, albeit tentative, evidence that high(er) degrees of reserves cover are actually achieved in countries where monetary development is lower.
This could perpetuate a cycle whereby, one the one hand, countries with relatively more developed monetary systems may not be able to sustain them (if they became independent countries), while on the other hand,  the overall amount of monetary liabilities (M2/GDP) could significantly increase in countries with higher reserves cover but less developed monetary systems. These developments could indicate that the commitment by France could both continue and increase. A comparison with other sub-Saharan countries appears to confirm many of the themes: the importance of exports of oil (in the case of Nigeria) and the inverse relationship between the reserves cover and the relative development of the monetary system. 

Conclusions

In summary, although the CFA monetary union is not an “optimal” currency area, it has allowed member countries to benefit from the unlimited international convertibility guaranteed by the political support from the French Treasury and from the enhanced policy credibility in achieving low inflation rates stemming from this political support by France and the closely related peg to the Euro. 
However, both benefits may be under threat. The international convertibility is potentially under threat due to the harder budgetary commitments imposed on France by its membership in the EuroZone. At the same time, the potential liability arising from the unlimited guarantee provided by the French Treasury, of the convertibility of the CFA Franc, is bound to grow over time as the banking and financial sectors in the CFA Franc Zone become more sophisticated. However, the actual burden will also be influenced by the ability of the member countries to accumulate net foreign reserves. There is some evidence that, historically, the oil exporting countries belonging to the CAEMU (Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon) have been in a better position to expand their net reserves. However, the net reserves of these countries are particularly vulnerable to unfavourable movements in the price of (and overall demand for) oil, a fact that will introduce an important element of unpredictability and uncertainty. Therefore, this paper argues that, although other factors like the ability to maintain and increase net international reserves by member countries and economic growth in France will play an important role, the overall cost of the international convertibility (as a proportion of French GDP) is bound to increase. This is happening in a situation of potentially dwindling interest in the CFA Franc Zone, as a monetary arrangement, shown in France, as tentatively evidenced by the number of questions asked in the French Parliament and the number of articles published in “Le Monde” and “Le Monde Diplomatique,” and further shown by a dwindling financial commitment in terms of development aid from France.  However, the countries belonging to the CFA Franc Zone are still very important to the foreign policy of France, and in this respect there does not seem to be a reduction in the French commitment. 
The policy credibility is being eroded by a combination of events, which has undermined confidence in the CFA Franc. In particular, the 1994 devaluation appeared to have been an important watershed, as evidenced by output-inflation trade-offs which, although still higher than similar sub-Saharan African countries, have been declining since the pre-1994 period and have suffered a one-off decline from around the time of the devaluation. The repeated failures to implement an economic and monetary union and comply with the criteria set out in the treaties to establish them may also have played a role in reducing the credibility of the CFA Franc.
In terms of policy, the contribution of this paper has been to stress the importance of the unlimited guarantee of the international convertibility of the CFA Franc that is provided by France, and to shed some light on its potentially increasing financial cost. This fact may lead to a reduced political commitment, perhaps already signalled by an apparently reduced interest in providing development assistance, although, as repeatedly stated in the paper, the member countries of the CFA Franc Zone are still considered important militarily.
From the point of view of the countries of the CFA Franc Zone, the paper has provided some evidence that the credibility gain stemming from their membership, as evidenced by the output-inflation trade-off, has deteriorated, potentially making the status quo more expensive in terms of political economy. 
However, it is important to state that possible alternatives (joining other currency areas with countries such as Nigeria and Ghana, or having national currencies) will definitely entail losing the unlimited guarantee offered by France. This loss could only be tolerated if the other gain of being a member of the CFA Franc Zone – i.e. better credibility in terms of economic policy due to favourable output-inflation trade-offs – was also lost. Although there is some evidence of a deterioration in the trade-off that may make continued membership less attractive, the output-inflation trade-offs are, if anything, even less favourable in other sub-Saharan African countries, in particular in countries like Nigeria and Ghana, making a potential monetary union with these countries not particularly attractive. 
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TABLES



Table 1: Median inflation rate and median real GDP growth
	Median Inflation rate (1974-2014)	Median Real GDP growth (1974-2014)
		
		
CAEMU		
Cameroon	7.7	4.1
Central African Republic	5.8	2.1
Chad	10.2	4.9
Republic of Congo	7.8	3.8
Gabon	8.5	3.7
		
WAEMU		
Benin	8.4	4.2
Burkina Faso	9.4	5.7
Côte d'Ivoire	6.6	1.8
Guinea-Bissau		
Mali	8.7	4.4
Niger	6.4	3.0
Senegal	6.4	3.5
Togo	6.0	2.5
		
OTHER SUB-SAHARAN COUNTRIES
Cape Verde	9.8	6.3
Ethiopia	11.2	8.2
Ghana	31.9	4.7
Kenya	13.7	4.1
Nigeria	17.6	4.4
Tanzania	21.1	5.3
Uganda	22.0	6.3
Zambia	23.6	4.5
		
Median rate for Sub-Saharan Africa (developing countries only)	9.2	3.5

Source World Bank World Development Indicators 2015


Table 2: Comparison GDP growth and inflation measured with deflator (selected sub-Saharan African countries) 1974-2014
Inflation (median 9.2%) 	HIGH INFLATION / LOW REAL GDP GROWTHInflationGDP %	HIGH INFLATION / HIGH REAL GDP GROWTHInflationGDP %Ethiopia11.28.2Ghana31.94.7Kenya13.74.1Nigeria17.64.4Tanzania21.15.3Uganda22.06.3Zambia23.64.5CAEMUChad10.24.9WAEMU Burkina Faso9.45.7
	LOW INFLATION / LOW REAL GDP GROWTHInflationGDP %CAEMUCentral African Republic5.82.1WAEMUCôte d'Ivoire6.61.8Niger6.43.0Senegal6.43.5Togo6.02.5	LOW INFLATION / HIGH REAL GDP GROWTHInflationGDP %CAEMUCameroon7.74.1Republic of Congo7.83.8Gabon8.53.7WAEMUBenin8.44.2Mali8.74.4
Real GDP Growth (Median 3.5%)
Source World Bank World Development Indicators 2015


Table 3: Estimates of the parameter  the output-inflation trade-offs for the CFA Franc Zone and comparator sub-Saharan African countries 1974-2014 unless otherwise specified in the table
			Wald test for restriction	Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation	
CAEMU						
Cameroon 	0.60 [0.000]*** 	-0.44 [0.0439] **	0.16 [0.2973]	[0.2319]	
Central African Republic 	0.23 [0.0010] ***	0.56 [0.0269]	0.79 [0.0006]***	[0.5076]	
Chad	0.59 [0.0009] ***	-0.23 [0.2341]	0.36[0.0006]****	[0.8459]	
Congo	0.30 [0.0000] ***	-0.27 [0.0021] ***	0.03 [0.56]	[0.1024]	
Gabon	0.46 [0.0000] ***	-0.42 [0.0000] ***	0.04[0.386]	[0.6355]	
WAEMU					
Benin	0.28 [0.0074] ***	-0.29 [0.044] **	-0.013 [0.849]	[0.096 (AR2)]	
Burkina Faso	0.19 [0.0534]	-0.02[0.9012]	0.17 [0.2265]	[0.2776]	
Cote d’Ivoire	0.17 [0.0233]	-0.005 [0.9752]	0.17 [0.2267]	[0.3018]	
Mali	0.47 [0.0001] ***	-0.46 [0.0063] ***	0.0005 [0.96]	[0.3958]	
Niger	0.42 [0.0068] ***	-0.18 [0.4378]	0.24 [0.2070]	[0.8249]	
Senegal	0.37[0.0002] *** 	-0.45 [0.0006] ***	0.088 [0.3584]	[0.8159]	
Togo	0.31 [0.0166] **	-0.026 [0.8572]	0.29 [0.000] ***	[0.0536]	
					
				
Cape Verde (1982-2014)	-0.0178 [0.8192]		
Ethiopia (1983-2014)	0.27 [0.0106]		
Ghana (1974-2014)	0.052 [0.3231]		
Kenya (1974-2014)	0.06 [0.2740]		
Nigeria (1974-2014)	0.07 [0.2184]		
Tanzania (1990-2014)	-0.10 [0.0979]		
Uganda (1984-2014)	-0.0063 [0.7460]		
Zambia (1974-2014)	-0.01437 [0.6319]		
Source:  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_40" \o "World Bank, 2013 #161"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>World Bank</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>161</RecNum><DisplayText>World Bank (2013)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>161</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1371119272">161</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>World Bank,</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>World Development Indicators</title></titles><dates><year>2013</year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>World Bank (2013) World Development Indicators, National Accounts, GDP at Local currency at both current and constant values. In brackets White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. Wald test for  ; ***1%, ** 5% and * 10% significance level 	



Table 4: Number of legislatures, period and total number of questions per legislature
Legislature	Period	Total number of questions
14	2012-present	95,906
13	2007-2012	138,596
12	2002-2007	128,635
11	1997-2002	81,304
10	1993-1997	55,068
9	1988-1993	70,070
8	1986-1988	40.960
7	1981-1986	83,381
Source: Assemble’ Nationale Recherche de questions
http://recherche2.assemblee-nationale.fr/questions/questions.jsp (​http:​/​​/​recherche2.assemblee-nationale.fr​/​questions​/​questions.jsp​)	


Table 5: Number of questions asked about “CFA Franc Zone” in the Assemble’ Nationale and number of articles published in “Le Monde” and “Le Monde Diplomatique” on “CFA Franc Zone”
Legislature	Period	Assemble’ Nationale	Le Monde	Le Monde Diplomatique
14	June 2012-present	7	4	0
13	June 2007-2012	5	50	4
12	June 2002-2007	15	46	6
11	June 1997-2002	56	83	13
10	March 1993-1997	217	109	26
9	June 1988-1993	5	57	6
8	March 1986-1988	0	12	2
7	June 1981-1986	1	38	3
	1970s		17	
	1960s		11	
TOTAL		306	427	60
Notes: the correlation coefficient between the number of questions and the number of articles is 0.80 and 0.96 for “Le Monde” and “Le Monde Diplomatique” respectively, while the correlation coefficient between the number of articles “Le Monde” and “Le Monde Diplomatique” is 0.92.


Table 6: Money and quasi money (M2) as a percentage of GDP
	1960	1980	2000	2010
CAEMU				
Cameroon 	10	23	15	22
Central African Republic 	10	22	17	18
Chad	7	13	12	14
Congo	24	17	15	22
Gabon	16	17	15	21
				
WAEMU				
Benin	0.2	20	29	39
Burkina Faso	0.2	13	21	27
Cote d’Ivoire	3	27	22	37
Mali	N/A	17	24	28
Niger	N/A	15	8	21
Senegal	0.5	24	24	40
Togo	0.4	30	27	45

OTHER COMPARATOR COUNTRIES
Cape Verde 	N/A	42	64	80
Ethiopia	N/A	16	35	N/A
Ghana 	19	19	28	30
Kenya 	4  (1961)	30	35	50
Nigeria	9	29	22	32
Tanzania 	N/A	17 (1988)	17	34
Uganda 	2 (1965)	15	16	27
Zambia 	14 (1965)	30	24	23
				
India	22	33	53	76
South Africa	60 (1965)	53	54	78
France	N/A	N/A	100	150
Germany	N/A	N/A	169	184
UK	40	32	106	179
USA	62	71	70	87
Source: World Bank Development Indicators


Table 7: Proportion of monnaie fiduciare, scriptural and quasi-monnaie
	Monnaie Fiduciare Cash and notes in circulation	Monnaie scripturalDeposits	Quasi-monnaieOther deposits and assets
CAEMU			
Cameroon 	17.7	44.2	38.2
Central African Republic 	51.2	29.9	18.9
Chad	52.6	39.8	7.5
Congo	25.6	63.4	11
Gabon	15.8	52.9	31.2
Equatorial Guinea 	20.5	68.9	10.7
			
WAEMU			
Benin	27.4	35.8	36.8
Burkina Faso	12.6	45.3	42.0
Cote d’Ivoire	33.8	34.5	31.6
Guinea-Bussau	49.5	34.3	16.3
Mali	27.8	45.5	26.6
Niger	44.1	34.2	21.7
Senegal	21.7	39.1	39.2
Togo	23.3	36.6	40.1
Source:  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_5" \o "Banque de France, 2011 #133"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Banque de France</Author><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>133</RecNum><DisplayText>Banque de France (2011)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>133</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1369226593">133</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Banque de France, </author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Rapport Annuel de la Zone Franc</title></titles><dates><year>2011</year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Banque de France (2011) Rapport Annuel de la Zone Franc 2011


Table 8: Reserves (%) of total and reserves cover (%)
	Reserves (%) of total	Reserves cover (%) measured as reserves divided by M2 for each country
	2001	2011	2001	2011
CAEMU				
Cameroon 	21.4	19.9	11.1	56.4
Central African Republic 	10.8	0.16	58.0	6.4
Chad	4.3	5.5	17.0	67.3
Congo	4.5	37.5	10.4	160.7
Gabon	-1.9	12.8	-2.0	57.4
Equatorial Guinea	11.0	19.5	100.1	144.6
Not allocated	49.7	4.3	N/A	N/A
Total CAEMU	100.0	100.0		
WAEMU				
Benin	21.6	12.3	86.6	52.0
Burkina Faso	5.9	11.7	30.2	45.4
Cote d’Ivoire	12.9	31.1	15.1	39.4
Guinea-Bissau	1.4	2.0	44.8	68.6
Mali	9.1	11.9	44.2	46.5
Niger	1.1	4.5	17.6	43.1
Senegal	7.8	14.8	18.7	31.8
Togo	2.5	5.0	22.8	35.0
Not allocated	37.4	6.4	895.7	101.8
Total WAEMU	100.0	100.0		

OTHER COMPARATOR COUNTRIES
Ethiopia	N/A	N/A	25	15.4 (in 2008)
Ghana	N/A	N/A	6.8	40.1
Kenya	N/A	N/A	25.1	19.3
Nigeria	N/A	N/A	101.2	52.4
Tanzania	N/A	N/A	66	48.3
Source:  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_5" \o "Banque de France, 2011 #133"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Banque de France</Author><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>133</RecNum><DisplayText>Banque de France (2011)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>133</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1369226593">133</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Banque de France, </author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Rapport Annuel de la Zone Franc</title></titles><dates><year>2011</year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Banque de France (2011) Rapport Annuel de la Zone Franc 2011. Please note that the reserves cover (%) for the WAEMU is the result of the ratio between reserves not allocated (non-repartis) and M2 allocated to “services generaux” (central services). 
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Figure 1: Estimates of the parameter  the output-inflation trade-offs with recursive least squares regression Source:  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_40" \o "World Bank, 2013 #161"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>World Bank</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>161</RecNum><DisplayText>World Bank (2013)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>161</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1371119272">161</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>World Bank,</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>World Development Indicators</title></titles><dates><year>2013</year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>World Bank (2013) World Development Indicators, National Accounts, GDP at Local currency at both current and constant values.


Figure 2: Number of questions asked about the “CFA Franc Zone” in the Assemble’ Nationale and number of articles published in “Le Monde” and “Le Monde Diplomatique” as percentage of total number of questions asked about the “CFA Franc Zone” over the period 1981-present.



Figure 3: French ODA to CFA Franc Zone countries as a percentage of Total French ODA to sub-Sahara Africa and French ODA to CFA Franc Zone countries as a percentage of Total French ODA to developing countries (5-year moving averages) (%)  Source:  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_28" \o "OECD, 2011 #153"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>OECD</Author><RecNum>153</RecNum><DisplayText>OECD (2011)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>153</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1369924350">153</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>OECD</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) Flows to developing countries</title></titles><dates><year>2011</year></dates><urls><related-urls><url>/content/data/data-00566-en</url><url>http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00566-en</url></related-urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>OECD (2011)





Figure 4: French ODA to CFA Franc Zone (Nominal and Real flows) 1964-2011​[14]​
Source: OECD (2011) Millions of US Dollars





Figure 5: French ODA to CFA Franc Zone as a proportion of French GDP (%) 1964-2011
Source: OECD (2011) 





Figure 6: French commitment as a proportion of French GDP (%) 1991-2011
Source: Banque de France (2011) Rapport Annuel de la Zone Franc, World Bank (2013) World Development Indicators and OECD (2011)


Notes:




PAGE  






^1	   	For a detailed description of  the CFA monetary union, inclusive of some recent developments, see  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_4" \o "Banque de France, 2010 #97"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Banque de France</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>97</RecNum><DisplayText>Banque de France (2010)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>97</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1368782065">97</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Banque de France,</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>The Franc Zone</title><secondary-title>Fact sheet</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Fact sheet</full-title></periodical><volume>N. 127</volume><number>July</number><dates><year>2010</year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Banque de France (2010), while  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_38" \o "Vizy, 1989 #152"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Vizy</Author><Year>1989</Year><RecNum>152</RecNum><DisplayText>Vizy (1989)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>152</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1369743479">152</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Vizy, M.</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>La Zone Franc</title></titles><dates><year>1989</year></dates><publisher>CHEAM [Centre des hautes études sur l&apos;Afrique et l&apos;Asie modernes]</publisher><isbn>9782903182274</isbn><urls><related-urls><url>http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=IRSLQgAACAAJ</url></related-urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Vizy (1989) provides a very detailed description of the workings of the CFA Franc Zone. See also the site of the Banque of France (http://www.banque-france.fr/eurosysteme-et-international/Zone-franc.html).
^2	  	However, following independence, several countries left the Zone: Tunisia (1958), Morocco (1959), Guinea (1960), Mali (1962), Algeria (1964), Madagascar and Mauritania (1973). Other countries that decided to leave the Franc Zone: Lebanon (1948), Syria (1949), Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (1954).  Mali re-entered the Franc Zone in 1968, and the CFA Franc replaced its currency, the Malian Franc, in 1984.
^3	  	In return for the unlimited guarantee, the two central banks must deposit 50% (down from 65%) of their net external assets in the Operation Accounts, with obligations to replenish the Operation accounts in case of deficits or expected shortfalls, and, finally, there’s a limit to the advance to national treasury of a maximum 20% of ordinary budget revenues of the previous fiscal year. 
^4	  	 HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_22" \o "Mange, 1999 #149"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Mange</Author><Year>1999</Year><RecNum>149</RecNum><DisplayText>Mange (1999)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>149</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1369395968">149</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Mange, Patrick</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>From CFA Franc to Afro-Euro</title><secondary-title>Deutsche Bank Research €MU Watch</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Deutsche Bank Research €MU Watch</full-title></periodical><volume>72</volume><dates><year>1999</year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Mange (1999) explains the details of the transition from the parity to the French Franc to the Euro at 655.957 CFA per Euro. The Maastricht Treaty would have brought the CFA Franc Zone under the control of the Council according to articles 109.1 and 101.2 and 101.3. However, France successfully argued that the CFA Franc Zone was not a monetary arrangement, but instead was one of “budgetary relevance” as the French Treasury, not the Bank of France, would intervene and replenish the Operations Accounts in case of need. As member countries are responsible for their own budgets, decisions were left to the French authorities.  
^5	  	Van de Walle (1991), Renou (2002) and more recently  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_24" \o "Melly, 2013 #159" Melly and Darracq (2013) have tried to give an answer to the question of what benefits France could obtain from the “Francafrique” policy, of which the CFA Franc Zone is an important pillar. They argue that although the financial benefits for France on aggregate may not be huge, for instance with French exports and imports to and from  sub-Saharan Africa accounting for a declining proportion of total French exports and imports, there might be some advantages for certain private (and state owned) firms. One possible answer is that the main benefits for France were political and diplomatic. For an account of the role of influential people of the CFA Franc Zone in the elections of presidents, see  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_39" \o "Wauthier, 1995 #150"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Wauthier</Author><Year>1995</Year><RecNum>150</RecNum><DisplayText>Wauthier (1995)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>150</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1369396051">150</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Wauthier, Claude</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Quatre Presidents et l&apos;Afrique: De Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard d&apos;Estaing, Mitterrand</title></titles><dates><year>1995</year></dates><publisher>Seuil</publisher><isbn>2020183560</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Wauthier (1995), while for an exhaustive analysis of the economic policy of the CFA Franc, see  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_34" \o "Stasavage, 1997 #124"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Stasavage</Author><Year>1997</Year><RecNum>124</RecNum><DisplayText>Stasavage (1997)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>124</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1369147917">124</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Stasavage, David</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>The CFA franc zone and fiscal discipline</title><secondary-title>Journal of African Economies</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>Journal of African Economies</full-title></periodical><pages>132-167</pages><volume>6</volume><number>1</number><dates><year>1997</year></dates><isbn>0963-8024</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Stasavage (1997) and, more recently,  HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_25" \o "Moncrieff, 2012 #158"  ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite AuthorYear="1"><Author>Moncrieff</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>158</RecNum><DisplayText>Moncrieff (2012)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>158</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="5fpt5wtrt9x5v6ew9sd5tdfpfrwf299xp5dd" timestamp="1371032220">158</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Moncrieff, Richard</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>French Africa policy: Sarkozy&apos;s legacy, and prospects for a Hollande Presidency</title><secondary-title>South African Journal of International Affairs</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>South African Journal of International Affairs</full-title></periodical><pages>359-380</pages><volume>19</volume><number>3</number><dates><year>2012</year></dates><isbn>1022-0461</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Moncrieff (2012).
^6	  	The use of the median is aimed at removing the impact of few outliers. The benchmark is from a sample of countries classified as sub-Saharan [developing only] provided by the World Bank World Development Indicators.
^7	  In equation (1), the variable D captures the effect of the 1994 devaluation for the countries belonging the CFA Franc Zone. As equations (1) and (2) are estimated for each country separately, and not as a panel or pool OLSQ, the variable D does not capture the membership of the CFA Franc Zone.
^8	  	In the website of the National Parliament (Assemblée Nationale), under the heading “accès directs”, it is possible to search a database on written and oral questions (“questions ecrites and orals”) by legislature.
^9	  	A staggering 235 questions were asked about the value of pensions as a consequence of the devaluation of the CFA Franc in 1994, while only 5 queried the consequences of the Euro for the CFA Franc Zone. There were 119 questions in 1994, and only 23 in 1995. 
^10	  	Just as a point of reference, a search in the historic Hansard (archive of questions asked in the House of Commons http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons) for the key words “CFA Franc Zone” returned four questions, two asked in 1993 and two in 2002. 
^11	  	It was not possible to find data on M2 and net external reserves for the countries belonging to CAEMU prior to 1991, while they were available for countries belonging to the WAEMU. The interest paid on the balances deposited in the Operation Accounts was not taken into consideration. In recent years, as the balances are increasingly positive, the interest payments would add to the French Commitment.
^12	  	I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that debt relief is also a form of development assistance, and for encouraging me to incorporate it in the analysis. 
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